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What are the principles of "freedom of speech" and "academic
freedom" that properly govern at a private university? May a religious
university, like my new home the University of St. Thomas, properly ban
controversial speech, exclude speakers it deems offensive, limit professors'
academic freedom, or refuse honorary degrees, based on its desire to
maintain a distinctive religious message and voice as a religious institution?
Recent controversies involving Ann Coulter, Desmond Tutu, and Bill Gates
have raised these questions in a prominent way for the University of St.
Thomas.
As a recent refugee from the University of Minnesota Law School,
where I taught for sixteen years, I am a newcomer to this side of the free
speech block. There, at a state university, the principles are, or at least
should be, clear: A state university is, legally, an arm of the government
and is constrained by the First Amendment. It may not properly censor
students' or guest speakers' expression, and, usually, not even faculty
members' expression, based on official disagreement with the content or
viewpoint being expressed. Private citizens and groups possess First
Amendment rights against the government, and the University of
Minnesota is, for these purposes, the government. Properly understood, a
state university has no "free speech" rights of its own. It is a public forum,
a common carrier, for the expression of views by members of the university
community.'
*Distinguished University Chair and Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law
(Minneapolis, MN). Prior to coming to the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Paulsen
served as the McKnight Presidential Professor of Law and Public Policy, Law Alumni
Distinguished Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship at the
University of Minnesota Law School. This essay is a slight revision of a lecture delivered in 2008
on the occasion of Professor Paulsen's appointment as University Chair.
1. On state universities as public fora for expression of views by members of their
university communities, the most important (and correct) Supreme Court precedents are Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university may not exclude otherwise-eligible student group
from use of university facilities for its meetings and expression, on the basis of the content of the
group's expression), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819 (1995) (applying the same principle to a student organization's request for consideration for
funding on the same basis as other student organizations). Both Widmar and Rosenberger
involved religious student organizations, but the free speech principle is applicable across the
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This has important consequences. A state university, as an institution,
does not have a free speech right to exclude views with which it disagrees;
it follows that controversial, extreme, or offensive views expressed by
students, student groups, guest speakers, and even faculty usually cannot
fairly be imputed to the university as the expression of its own views. The
University of Minnesota does not endorse everything it fails to censor,
because it legally cannot censor speech with which its officials disagree.2
A private university is in an altogether different situation, almost the
precise opposite one. It is not constrained by the First Amendment; it is
empowered by the First Amendment, vested with its own rights, as an
organization, to the freedom of speech. In First Amendment jargon, a
private university is an "expressive association" possessing the
constitutional right to express its views as an institution, to control its
membership decisions (e.g., faculty, students) so as to control its message,
and to exclude voices and messages with which it disagrees or speakers of
whom it disapproves. To some extent the University of St. Thomas might
be thought to endorse speakers or groups it fails to censor, precisely
because it has the legal right to do so.'
range of university constituents.
2. For a crisp, clear expression of this proposition, see Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1, 14 (1985) ("The argument most often pressed against the Equal Access Act is that
allowing religious speech in high schools is an actual or apparent endorsement of religion. The
claim of actual endorsement is absurd. Perhaps in a totalitarian state the government implicitly
endorses all that it does not censor. But no such inference can be drawn in a nation with a
constitutional guarantee of free speech. Indeed, the core case for first amendment protection is
speech critical of the government. No governmental unit can interfere with such speech, but it
obviously does not follow that the government endorses the critical message."). See also Westside
School District v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) ("We think that secondary school students
are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis .... The proposition that schools do not
endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.").
In a well-known recent controversy, a group of state university and private university law
schools asserted that they possessed a First Amendment free speech right to exclude United States
government military recruiters from their campus facilities, and that a federal statute that
withdrew federal funds from such schools if they did so was therefore unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court unanimously rejected this claim. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc. ("FAIR"), 547 U.S. 47 (2006). As to state universities, there was a.
further ground for rejecting such a claim, not separately discussed by the Court in Rumsfeld v.
FAIR: state universities do not possess First Amendment rights; rather, quite the reverse, as state
actors they are constrained by the First Amendment. If a state university had "free speech" rights
of its own to exclude the expression of views with which it disapproved, Widmar and
Rosenberger would have been decided differently.
3. The principle is well established. See, e.g., Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995); Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). For an extended
general discussion of this issue, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the
Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access "for Religious
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653 (1996). On this principle's application to Boy
Scouts v. Dale, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 Minn. L. Rev.
1917, 1919-1939 (2000). On the specific issue of a private university's freedom to exclude from
its programs or facilities organizations whose views or practices it finds antithetical to its own
mission or message, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, How Yale Law School Trivializes Religious
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II.
What should a private religious university, a faith community, do with
its First Amendment freedom to define the parameters of free speech and
academic freedom that will prevail within its community? The fact that one
possesses a freedom (of speech, or of anything else) does not itself tell you
what it is you should do with that freedom or, indeed, whether you should
exercise it at all. As is appropriate with a freedom, different folks and
different expressive associations will choose different answers.
My view is that a good case can be made for adopting the principles of
the First Amendment as an internal rule of self-regulation: freedom of
speech is, generally, good policy. It avoids, to some extent, the problem of
mistaken attribution. When a student group invites Ann Coulter to speak at
its university, such as St. Thomas, pursuant to the school's "free speech"
policy, no one thinks that she speaks for St. Thomas as an institution. She
speaks for herself, and any offense she gives is not fairly attributable to St.
Thomas. The University's commitment is to free speech, not Ann Coulter's
views.
On the other hand, sometimes the attribution problem is too severe to
be ignored. If a Catholic university were to grant an honorary degree to a
major financial backer of pro-abortion advocacy organizations (the Bill
Gates issue), it is hard to deny that the university "owns" whatever message
is thereby conveyed. The University's choices of speakers for
commencement or for distinguished lectureships, or even for endowed
chairs, pose similar problems, though perhaps to a slightly lesser degree:
these are, after all, speakers selected by the institution. So, too, the
deliberate hiring by a Catholic university of openly pro-abortion-rights
Roman Catholic faculty members would pose serious and legitimate
concerns of imputation of such views to the University itself. It would also
cause "scandal," a related but distinct concern of embarrassment to the
message the institution and the community wish to convey, occasioned by
the apparent conflict between the community's stated views and certain
aspects of its practice.
Generally, aside from fundamental matters at the heart of the Faith, the
better course may be to give a broad berth to academic freedom and dissent,
especially in professors. Once again, a free speech policy tends to
diminish, it does not entirely remove, the concern that professors' views
will be counted as the university's speech. Disclaimers help, when they are
believable: "Be Advised: Michael Paulsen does not speak for the University
of St. Thomas!" That, of course, was the case when I was at the University
of Minnesota; nobody thought it particularly necessary to warn readers or
Devotion, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1259 (1997) (regretting as a policy matter, but defending as a
constitutional matter, Yale Law School's exclusion of a Christian religious freedom advocacy
organization from use of the school's placement office services, because the Christian
organization had a statement of faith to which it asked its lawyer-employees to subscribe).
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hearers that the views I might express were not the official, approved views
of the government of Minnesota.
A free speech policy distances a religious university from the views
expressed by any particular speaker. The downside of such a policy is that
it, too, sends a subtle message: the university values free expression more
than other things, such as the clarity of its repudiation of abortion, racism,
hatred, genocide, terrorism, or even mere bad manners. That might be the
right stance for a religious university to embrace, simply because it is a
university: we value free speech more than anything else. But this is
always a choice, and choices have consequences.
Of course, the best and easiest way to avoid or mitigate the mistaken
attribution problem is to be clear in the things for which you stand. I call
this the "Planting the Flag" principle. The best way to make clear that an
institution's commitment is pro-life is not to go around nervously
suppressing pro-abortion speakers or seeking to negate inferences of
implied endorsement from failure to censor, but for the institution to speak
clearly and unmistakably in a pro-life fashion. The best disclaimer is an
affirmation.
One thing that should be clear from all this is that mere recitation of the
terms "free speech" or "academic freedom," so often sloppily bandied
about, does not dispose of the problem. For in the case of a private
university, the freedom of speech is the university's right to stand for what
it wishes to stand for and to control the content of messages spoken under
its auspices. Academic freedom is, in the case of a private university, the
university's right to teach, research, and serve in accordance with its own
principles, free from interference by outsiders, and to prescribe the
standards for its own community that it thinks most appropriate.
The rhetoric of free speech, even where replete with disclaimers and
disavowals, and even where coupled with clear affirmations of principle,
cannot entirely shield a religious university's act of providing a platform to
horrific speakers and views. Everybody has his or her "squeal point."
These differ, and are probably not perfectly susceptible to principled
definition. Here is my squeal point: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is a monster-a
Holocaust-denying, wipe-Israel-off-the-map, Jew-hating mini-Hitler. At
some level, Columbia University's invitation of Ahmadinejad spoke for
Columbia's values (notwithstanding its president's condemnation of
Ahmadinejad and the removal of any sign of Columbia's name or seal from
the stage). In the end, Columbia chose to give Ahmadinejad a prestigious
platform for expressing his views.
Desmond Tutu is no Ahmadinejad and University of St. Thomas
President Father Dennis Dease's retreat in the fall of 2007, withdrawing the
withdrawing of co-sponsorship of an event in which Tutu was to be a
speaker, was probably a wise retreat. A harsh, even offensive, historical
comparison of Israel settlement policy to Nazi policy is not Holocaust
advocacy. Further, the context and degree of St. Thomas's involvement
rendered any perceived endorsement of Tutu's views remote. But all such
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judgments involve line drawing and reasonable people will draw their lines
in different places. Father Dease drew a line. Many in the University
community disagreed with where he drew it. (I did, too.) But it was not, in
principle, wrong for Father Dease to make such a judgment. It was not a
violation of the principles of freedom of speech and academic freedom; it
was an exercise of the freedom of speech.
III.
I close with a final, somewhat ironic footnote. I originally wrote a
somewhat briefer version of these remarks, literally overnight, in response
to a desperate request for last-minute replacement copy for the inaugural
issue of the St. Thomas Lawyer magazine. It seems that two invited authors
had, quite accidentally, ended up writing about the same topic and nearly
duplicating each other's submissions. So the editors axed one, and asked
me if I could produce something interesting and provocative within a day or
two. I did, or tried to, but the editors apparently thought it a little bit too
interesting or provocative, and they axed my article, too.
As is usual with me on such things, I did not quite know whether to be
amused or irritated. What a delicious irony! An article discussing free
speech at a private university was vetoed by a private university on the
ground that it was too sensitive a topic! Yet, in a reverse irony, by the logic
of my own reasoning, this was an entirely appropriate exercise by the
private university of its constitutional rights to freedom of speech and to
control the content of its own messages. (The magazine is, after all, St.
Thomas's magazine, and the University certainly has the right to control
what gets said in its own pages.) But wait! There is double-reverse irony:
For here I am, speaking about it, at a St. Thomas event, under St. Thomas
auspices, as a St. Thomas professor, receiving a St. Thomas endowed chair,
a great university honor. Has not St. Thomas thereby endorsed everything I
have said?! Should not someone have stopped me from saying these
things?
Ultimately, this dizzying series of bizarre reverse-reverse-ironies has to
end up proving either one or the other of two things. The first alternative is
that all of this tends to demonstrate the utter futility of attempting to
regulate speech in a private university and the wisdom of adopting free-
speech policies. Professors are a rambunctious, disorderly bunch and you
should probably adopt free speech principles just so whatever they say ends
up doing less damage to the institution's message. Students are even more
difficult to control.
The other alternative is that you have to be a much, much more
aggressive censor: You need to be much more careful about whom you
choose to receive endowed university chairs.
